FERC took a week to not supply what was requested
in Beth Gordon’s FOIA,
and apparently if you’ve organized your property under an LLC,
your LLC name is visible on the redacted list,
even if that name includes your personal name.
Whose privacy is FERC protecting, anyway, now that all landowners
along the proposed pipline path have had their privacy invaded
by the pipeline company?
Here’s what
Beth Gordon asked for 2 January 2014:
A list of each and every landowner in Florida contacted by Sabal
Trail LLC by mail to inform them that they are on, or may be on, the
proposed pipeline and/or proposed survey map for this project.
Here’s what
FERC sent back 10 January 2014:
A redacted version of the Sabal Trails landowner list that was
submitted to FERC of October 4, 2013 in docket number PF-14-1 has
been previously released under the Freedom of Information Act
(FOIA). This document is identified in the FERC e-library as
accession number 20131004-5123 (Appendix B). Please find attached
part 1 and part 2 of this redacted list. Additional emails will be
provided with the remainder of this material. We will also provide a
courtesy copy of the public cover letter for this submittal.
Appendix B of
20131004-5123 is marked on FERC’s website as:
You don’t have permission to access this document.
This document (eLibrary accession no. 20131004-5123) is Privileged.
The public may file a FOIA request under 18 C.F.R. 388.108.
Here are the four parts Continue reading Sloppy FOIA redaction from FERC for Sabal Trail pipeline landowners →
Five years ago a natural gas pipeline blew up between the Florida Turnpike
and I-95, flying a 104-foot piece of 18-inch pipe through the air,
shutting down both roads, and fortunately missing a high school.
NTSB determined it was the fault of the pipeline operator,
Florida Gas Transmission Company, LLC (FGT).
FGT was
written up by the National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB)
in
NTSB/PAB-13/01 of 13 August 2013
for “Damage/Clean-up Cost: $606,360” in this 4 May 2009 incident
near Palm City, Florida:
The National Transportation Safety Board determines that the probable cause of the accident was environmentally assisted cracking under a disbonded polyethylene coating that remained undetected by the integrity management program. Contributing to the accident was Florida Gas Transmission Company’s failure to include the pipe section that ruptured in the integrity management program. Contributing to the prolonged gas release was the pipeline controller’s inability to detect the rupture because of SCADA system limitations and the configuration of the pipeline.
